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Abstract. Recent deep learning based video synthesis approaches, in
particular with applications that can forge identities such as “Deep-
Fake”, have raised great security concerns. Therefore, corresponding deep
forensic methods are proposed to tackle this problem. However, existing
methods are either based on unexplainable deep networks which greatly
degrades the principal interpretability factor to media forensic, or rely
on fragile image statistics such as noise pattern, which in real-world sce-
narios can be easily deteriorated by data compression. In this paper,
we propose an fully-interpretable video forensic method that is designed
specifically to expose deep-faked videos. To enhance generalizability on
videos with various content, we model the temporal motion of multiple
specific spatial locations in the videos to extract a robust and reliable
representation, called co-motion pattern. Such kind of conjoint pattern
is mined across local motion features which is independent of the video
contents so that the instance-wise variation can also be largely allevi-
ated. More importantly, our proposed co-motion pattern possesses both
superior interpretability and sufficient robustness against data compres-
sion for deep-faked videos. We conduct extensive experiments to empiri-
cally demonstrate the superiority and effectiveness of our approach under
both classification and anomaly detection evaluation settings against the
state-of-the-art deep forensic methods.
Keywords: Deepfake, Video forensic, Co-motion pattern, Anomaly de-
tection
1 Introduction
Media forensic, referring to judge the authenticity, detect potentially manipu-
lated region and reason its decision of the given images/videos, plays an impor-
tant role in real life to prevent media data from being edited and utilized for
malicious purposes, e.g., spreading fake news [16,2]. Unlike traditional forgery
methods (e.g., copy-move and slicing) which can falsify the original content with
low cost but are also easily observable, the development of deep generative mod-
els such as generative adversarial net (GAN) [13] makes the boundary between
realness and forgery more blurred than ever, as deep models are capable of
learning the distribution from real-world data so well. In this paper, among
all the forensic-related tasks, we focus on exposing forged videos produced by
face swapping and manipulation applications [25,23,56,40,45,55]. These meth-
ods, while initially designed for entertainment purposes, have gradually become
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Fig. 1: Example of motion analysis results by our method. Landmarks with
the same color are considered having analogous motion patterns, which are con-
sistent with facial structure in real videos but not in deep-faked videos. We
compactly model such patterns and utilize them to determine the authenticity
of given videos.
uncontrollable in particular when the face of celebrities, who possess greater so-
cial impact such as Obama [43], can be misused at no cost, leading to pernicious
influence.
Traditional forensic methods focusing on detecting specific traces remained
ineluctably during the editing (e.g., inconsistency in re-sampling [44], shadow-
ing [22], reflection [41], compression quality [11] and noise pattern [42]) fail to
tackle the indistinguishable DNN-generated images/videos due to the powerful
generative ability of existing deep models. Therefore, the demand for foren-
sic approaches explicitly against deep-faked videos is increasing. Existing deep
forensic models can be readily categorized into three branches including real-
forged binary classification-based methods [30,67,49,1], anomaly image statistics
detection based approaches [29,32,36,10,64] and high-level information driven
cases [62,63,31]. However, no matter which kind of methods, their success heav-
ily relies on a high-quality, uncompressed and well-labeled forensic dataset to
facilitate the learning. Once the given data are compressed or in low-resolution,
their performance is inevitably affected. More importantly, these end-to-end deep
forensic methods are completely unexplainable, no explicit reason can be pro-
vided by these methods to justify based on what a real or fake decision is made.
To overcome the aforementioned issues, in this paper, we propose a video
forensic method based on motion features to explicitly against deep-faked videos.
Our method aims to model the conjoint patterns of local motion features from
real videos, and consequently spot the abnormality of forged videos by comparing
the extracted motion pattern against the real ones. To do so, we first estimate
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Fig. 2: The pipeline of our proposed co-motion pattern extraction method. As
illustrated, we firstly estimate the motion of corresponding keypoints, which are
then to be grouped for analysis. On top of that, we construct co-motion pattern
as a compact representation to describe the relationship between motion features.
motion features of keypoints that are commonly shared across deep-faked videos.
In order to enhance the generalizability of obtained motion features as well as
eliminate noises introduced by inaccurate estimation results, we divide motion
features into various groups which are further reformed into a correlation matrix
as a more compact frame-wise representation. Then a sequence of correlation
matrices are calculated from each video, with each weighted by the grouping
performance to form the co-motion pattern which describes the local motion
consistency and correlation of the whole video. In general, co-motion patterns
collected from real videos obey the movement pattern of facial structures and
are homogeneous with each other regardless of the video content variation, while
it becomes less associated across fake videos.
To sum up, our contributions are four-fold: (1) We propose co-motion pat-
tern, a descriptor of consecutive image pairs that can be used to effectively
describe local motion consistency and correlation. (2) The proposed co-motion
pattern is being entirely explainable, robust to video compression/pixel noises
and generalizes well. (3) We conduct experiments under both classification and
anomaly detection settings, showing that the co-motion pattern is able to accu-
rately reveal the motion-consistency level of given videos. (4) We also evaluate
our method on datasets with different quality and forgery methods, with the
intention to demonstrate the robustness and transferability of our method.
2 Related Work
2.1 Face Forgery by Media Manipulation
First of all, we review relevant human face forgery methods. Traditionally, meth-
ods such as copy-move and slicing, if employed for face swapping tasks, can
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hardly produce convincing result due to the inconsistency caused by image qual-
ity [44,59,12], lighting changing [17,18] and noise patterns [42,35] between the
tampered face region and other regions. With the rapid expeditious development
of deep generative models [13], the quality of generated images has significantly
improved. The success of ProGAN [19] makes visually determining the authen-
ticity of generated images pretty challenging if only focusing on the face region.
Furthermore, the artifacts remained in boundary regions whose corresponding
distribution in training datasets are relatively disperse are also progressively
eliminated by [20,21,24,4]. Although these methods have demonstrated appeal-
ing generating capability, they do not focus on a certain identity but generate
faces with random input.
Currently, the capability of deep neural networks has also been exploited
for human-related tasks such as face swapping [57,26,25,56,55,38,40,51], face ex-
pression manipulation [45,56,61,52] and facial attribute editing [52,15,60,47,14]
majorly for entertainment purposes at the initial stage (samples of deep-faked
face data are shown in Fig. 3.). However, since the face swapping methods in
particular have already been misused for commercial purposes, homologous tech-
niques should be studied and devised as prevention measures before it causing
irreparable adverse influence.
Fig. 3: Samples to illustrate what “Deepfake” is. Top left [21]: high fidelity gen-
erated faces. Top right [50]: face swapping. Bottom left [45]: face expression
manipulation, original image on top and expression manipulated on bottom.
Bottom right [14]: face attribute editing, original images on top and edited on
bottom.
2.2 Deep-faked Manipulation Detection
While media forensic has been a long existing field, the countermeasures against
deep-faked images and videos are scarce. As we mentioned earlier, existing meth-
ods can be categorized into three genres, respectively by utilizing a deep neural
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network [30,48,49,1,67,3,37,28,53], by exploiting the unnatural low-level statis-
tics and by detecting the abnormality of high-level information. In the very first
category, it has been usually considered as a binary classification problem where
a classifier is constructed to learn the boundary between original and manipu-
lated data via hand-crafted or deep features. As one of the earliest works in this
branch, [1] employs an Inception [54] with proper architecture improvement to
directly classify each original or edited frame. Later, in order to consider the
intra-frame correlation, [49] constructed a recurrent convolutional neural net-
work that learns from temporal sequences. Due to the variety of video content
and the characteristics of neural network, a sufficiently large dataset is required.
To overcome this problem, [3] attempted using the optical flow as input to train
a neural network. While high classification accuracy achieved, since the features
learned directly by neural networks yet to be fully comprehended, the decision
of whether the input data has been manipulated cannot be appropriately eluci-
dated.
Regarding the second category, [10,36,64,8] have all utilized the characteris-
tics that the current deep generated images can barely learn the natural noise
carried with untampered images, hence using the noise pattern for authentica-
tion. In [29], the diminutive difference of color components between original and
manipulated images for classification. While effective, these methods are also
exceedingly susceptible to the quality of dataset. Our method lies in the third
category and is constructed based upon high-level information [62,63], which are
generally being more explainable and robust to the miniature pixel change in-
troduced by compression or noise. Furthermore, as co-motion pattern is derived
by second-order statistics, it is being more robust than [62,63] to instance-wise
variation.
3 Methodology
In this section, we elaborate on the details of our proposed video forensic method
based on co-motion pattern extraction from videos and the overall pipeline of
our method is illustrated in Fig. 2. Firstly, we obtain aligned local motion feature
describing the movement of specific keypoints from the input videos (Sect. 3.1).
To eliminate the instance-wise deviation, we then design high-order patterns
among the extracted local motion features. Subsequently, we demonstrate how
to construct co-motion patterns that describe the motion consistency over each
video, as well as its usage altogether in Sect. 3.2.
3.1 Local Motion Estimation
The fundamental of constructing co-motion pattern is to extract local motion
features firstly. Since each co-motion pattern is comprised by multiple indepen-
dent correlation matrices (explained in Sect. 3.2), we expound on how to obtain
local motion features from two consecutive frames in this section first.
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Denote a pixel on image I with coordinate (x, y) at time t as I(x, y, t), ac-
cording to brightness constancy assumption, we have [27,5]:
I(x, y, t) = I(x+∆x, y +∆x, t+∆t) (1)
where ∆x,∆y and ∆t denote the displacements on R3 respectively. ∆t is usually
1 to denote two consecutive frames. This leads to the optical flow constraint:
∂I
∂x
∆x+
∂I
∂y
∆y +
∂I
∂t
= 0 (2)
However, such a hard constraint can lead motion estimation result to be sensitive
to even slight changes in brightness, and therefore gradient constancy assumption
is proposed [58,5]:
∇I(x, y, t) = ∇I(x+∆x, y +∆y, t+ 1) (3)
where
∇ = (∂x, ∂y)ᵀ (4)
Based on above constraints, the objective function can be formulated as:
min
∆x,∆y
Etotal(∆x,∆y) = Ebrightness + αEsmoothness (5)
where:
Ebrightness =
∫∫
ψ(I(x, y, t)− I(x+∆x, y +∆y, t+ 1)) +
ψ(∇I(x, y, t)−∇I(x+∆x, y +∆y, t+ 1))dxdy
(6)
α denotes a weighting parameter and ψ denotes a concave cost function, and
Esmoothness penalization term is introduced to avoid too significant motion dis-
placement:
Esmoothness =
∫∫
ψ(|∇x|2 + |∇y|2)dxdy (7)
In our approach, we utilize Liu’s [33] dense optical flow to estimate motion over
frame pairs. However, while the intra-frame movement is estimable, it cannot be
used directly as motion features because the content of each video varies consid-
erably which makes the comparison between the estimated motion of different
videos unreasonable [3]. Moreover, the estimated motion cannot be pixel-wise
accurate due to the influence of noises and non-linear displacements.
To overcome the above problems, we propose to narrow the region of interests
via finding facial landmarks for comparison. By employing an arbitrary facial
landmark detector fD, we are able to obtain a set of spatial coordinates L as:
fD(I) = LI = {liI |liI ∈ R2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} (8)
so that the local motion features MI can be denoted as:
MI = {miI |miI = I∆x,∆y ⊕N (liI ± kˆ), liI ∈ LI} (9)
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Fig. 4: Illustration of local motion estimation step.
representing the Gaussian-weighted average of estimated motion map I∆x,∆y
centered on (lxi , l
y
i ) with stride kˆ. The Gaussian smoothing is introduced to fur-
ther mitigate the negative impact by inaccurate estimation result. By doing so,
we align the motion feature extracted from each video for equitable comparison.
An intuitive illustration of this step is presented in Fig. 4. Due to the lack of
sufficient motion in some I∆x,∆y, we abandon these with trivial magnitude by
setting a hyperparameter as threshold where the detailed choice will be discussed
in Sect. 4.
3.2 Co-motion Patterns
Depending merely on local motion features obtained above would require an
incredibly large-scale dataset to cover as many scenarios as possible, which is
redundant and costly. Based on the observation that a human face is an ar-
ticulated structure, the intra-component correlation can also depict the motion
in an efficient manner. Inspired by the co-occurrence feature [65], which has
been frequently employed in texture analysis, we propose to further calculate
the second-order statistics from extracted local motion features.
Grouping Intra-Correlated Motion Features
In this step, we group analogous miI ∈ MI to estimate articulated facial struc-
ture by motion features since motion features that are collected from the same
facial component would more likely to share consistent movement. Meanwhile,
the negative correlation can also be represented where motion features having
opposite directions (e.g. upper lip and lower lip) would be assigned to disjoint
groups. As miI ∈ R2 denotes motion on two orthogonal directions, we construct
the affinity matrix AI on MI such that:
Ai,jI = m
i
I ·mjI (10)
We here choose the inner product over other metrics such as cosine and eu-
clidean since we wish to both emphasize the correlation instead of difference and
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to lighten the impact of noise within MI . In specific, using inner product can en-
sure the significance of two highly correlated motions that both possess certain
magnitude to be highlighted, while noises with trivial magnitude would rela-
tively affect less. The normalized spectral clustering [39,34] is then performed,
where we calculate the degree matrix D such that:
Di,jI =
{∑n
j A
i,j
I if i = j
0 if i 6= j (11)
and the normalized Laplacian matrix L as:
L = (DI)− 12 (DI −AI)(DI) 12 (12)
In order to split MI into K disjoint groups, the first K eigenvectors of L, de-
note as V = {νk|k ∈ [1,K]}, are extracted to form matrix F ∈ Rn×K . After
normalizing F by dividing the corresponding L2-norms row-wisely, a K-Means
clustering is used to separate P = {pi|pi = F i ∈ RK , i ∈ [1, n]} into K clusters
where Ck = {i|pi ∈ Ck}. However, since K is not directly available in our case,
we will demonstrate how to determine the optimal K in the next step.
Constructing Co-motion Patterns
As previously stated, determining a proper K can also assist in describing the
motion pattern more accurately. A straightforward approach is to iterate through
all possible K such that the Calinski-Harabasz index [7] is maximized:
arg max
K∈[2,n]
fCH({Ck|k ∈ [1,K]},K) (13)
where
fCH({Ck|k ∈ [1,K]},K) =
tr(
∑K
y
∑
pi∈Cy (pi − Cµy )(pi − Cµy )ᵀ)
tr(
∑K
y |Cy|(Cµy −MµI )(Cµy −MµI )ᵀ)
×n−K
K − 1 (14)
with Cµy is the centroid of Cy, M
µ
I is the center of all local motion features and
tr denotes taking the trace of the corresponding matrix. After all the efforts, the
motion correlation matrix ρIt,It+1 of two consecutive frames It and It+1 can be
calculated as:
ρi,jIt,It+1 =
{
1 if (mi ∈ Ck & mj ∈ Ck | ∃Ck)
0 otherwise
(15)
and consequently, the co-motion pattern of sequence S = {I1, ..., IT } is calculated
as the weighted average of all correlation matrices:
fCP (S) =
T∑
t
kIt,It+1 × fCH({Ck|k ∈ [1,K]}, kIt,It+1)× ρIt,It+1 (16)
where the weighting procedure is also to reduce the impact of noise: the greater
the fCH({Ck|k ∈ [1,K]},K), naturally the more consistent the motions are;
simultaneously, co-motion pattern constructed on noisy estimated local motion
would scatter more sparse, which should be weighted as less important.
Abbreviated paper title 9
Usage of Co-motion Patterns
The co-motion pattern can be utilized as a statistical feature for comparison
purposes. When used for supervised classification, each co-motion must be nor-
malized by its L1 norm:
f˙CP (S) =
fCP (S)∑ |fCP (S)| (17)
and f˙CP (S) can be used as features for arbitrary objectives. In order to illustrate
that our co-motion pattern can effectively distinguish all forgery types by only
modeling on real videos, we also conduct anomaly detection experiments where a
real co-motion pattern is firstly built as template. Then, co-motion patterns from
real and forgery databases are all compared against the template where the nat-
uralness is determined by the threshold. JensenShannon divergence is suggested
to be employed as distance measure between any two co-motion patterns:
dKL(fCP (S1), fCP (S2)) =
∑
i
i−1∑
j
fCP (S1)
i,j log(
fCP (S1)
i,j
fCP (S2)i,j
) (18)
dJS(fCP (S1), fCP (S2)) =
1
2
dKL(fCP (S1), fCP S1,S2)+
1
2
dKL(fCP (S2), fCP S1,S2)
(19)
where fCP S1,S2 =
fCP (S1)+fCP (S2)
2 and S1, S2 denote two sequences.
4 Experiments
In this section, extensive experiments are conducted to empirically demonstrate
the feasibility of our co-motion pattern, coupled with the advantages over other
methods. We first describe the experiment protocol, followed by the choice of
hyperparameters. The quantitative performance of our method evaluated on dif-
ferent datasets is reported and analyzed in Sect. 4.1. Subsequently, we interpret
the composition of the co-motion pattern, showing how it can be used for de-
termining the genuineness of any given sequence or even individual estimated
motion set. Finally, we demonstrate the transferability and robustness of our
method under different scenarios.
Dataset We evaluate our method on FaceForensics++ [48] dataset which con-
sists of four sub-databases that produce face forgery via different methods, i.e.
Deepfake [57], FaceSwap [26], Face2Face [56] and NeuralTexture [55]. In addi-
tion, we utilize the real set from [9] to demonstrate the similarity of co-motion
patterns from real videos. Since each sub-database contains 1,000 videos, we
form 2,000 co-motion patterns with each composed of picking N ρ matrices for
training and testing respectively. We use c23 and c40 to indicate the quality
of datasets, which are compressed by H.264 [46] with 23 and 40 as constant
rate quantization parameters. Unless otherwise stated, all of our performance
reported are achieved on c23. The validation set and testing set are split before
any experiments to ensure no overlapping would interfere the results.
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Table 1: Accuracy of our method on all four forgery databases, with each treated
as a binary classification task against the real videos. Performance of [53] is
estimated from figures in the paper.
Method/Dataset Deepfakes FaceSwap Face2Face NeuralTexture Combined
Xception [48] 93.46% 92.72% 89.80% N/A 95.73%
R-CNN [49] 96.90% 96.30% 94.35% N/A N/A
Optical Flow + CNN [3] N/A N/A 81.61% N/A N/A
FacenetLSTM [53] 89% 90% 87% N/A N/A
N = 1 (Ours) 63.65% 61.90% 56.50% 56.65% 57.05%
N = 10 (Ours) 82.80% 81.95% 72.30% 68.50% 71.30%
N = 35 (Ours) 95.95% 93.60% 85.35% 83.00% 88.25%
N = 70 (Ours) 99.10% 98.30% 93.25% 90.45% 94.55%
Implementation In this section, we specify hyperparameters and other de-
tailed settings in order to reproduce our method. The local motion estimation
procedure is accomplished by integrating [5] as the estimator and [6] as the land-
mark detector, both with default parameter settings as reported in the original
papers. For the facial landmarks, we only keep the last 51 landmarks out of 68 in
total as the first 17 denotes the face boundary which is usually not manipulated.
During the calculation of co-motion, we constrain K to be at most 8 as only
8 facial components, thus avoiding unnecessary computation. Since a certain
portion of frames do not contain sufficient motion, we only preserve co-motion
patterns with p% motion features having greater magnitude than the total p%
of others, i.e. p = 0.5 with magnitude ≥ 0.85, where the number is acquired by
randomly sampling a set of 100 videos. An AdaBoost [66] classifier is employed
for all supervised classification tasks. For Gaussian smoothing, we set kˆ = 3 for
all experiments.
4.1 Quantitative Results
In this section, we demonstrate the quantitative results of our method under
different settings. At first, we show that the co-motion pattern can adequately
separate forged and real videos in classification tasks as shown in Tab. 1. Com-
paring with other state-of-the-art forensic methods in terms of classification ac-
curacy, we have achieved competent performance and have outperformed them
by a large margin on Deepfakes [57] and FaceSwap [26], respectively 99.10%
and 98.30%. In [3], while the researchers have similarly attempted establishing
a forensic pipeline on top of motion features, we have outperformed its perfor-
mance by approx. 12%. It is noteworthy that [49,53,48] are all exploiting deep
features that are learned in an end-to-end manner and consequently cannot be
properly explained. By contrast, as interpretability is one of the principal factors
to media forensics, our attention lies on proposing a method such that it can be
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Fig. 5: Anomaly detection performance of our co-motion patterns.
justified and make no effort on deliberately outperforming deep learning based
methods.
Equally importantly, as forgery methods are various and targeting each is
expensive, we demonstrate that the proposed co-motion pattern can also be
employed for anomaly detection tasks, where only the behaviors of real videos
require to be modeled, and forged videos can be separated if an appropriate
threshold is selected. As presented in Fig. 5, we show receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) curves on each forgery database with increasing N . The real
co-motion template is constructed of 3,000 randomly selected ρ matrices for
each co-motion pattern (real or fake) to compare against during evaluation. In
general, our method can be used for authenticating videos even without super-
vision. In the next section, we exhibit that the co-motion pattern is also robust
to random noise and data compression.
4.2 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate the robustness of our proposed method against
noises or data compression and the generalizability of co-motion patterns. Exper-
iments about whether the compression rate of the video and noise would affect
the effectiveness of co-motion patterns are conducted and the results are shown
in Tab. 2. Empirically, co-motion has demonstrated great robustness against
12 G. Wang et al.
heavy compression (c40) and random noise, i.e. N(µ, σ2) with µ = 0 and σ = 1.
Such results verify our proposed co-motion patterns exploiting high-level tem-
poral information are much less sensitive to pixel-level variation, while statistics
based methods as reviewed in Sect. 2.2 do not possess this property.
Table 2: Robustness experiment for demonstrating that co-motion can maintain
its characteristics under different scenarios. All experiments are conducted on
Deepfake [57] with N = 35. Classification accuracy and area under curve (AUC)
are reported respectively.
Setting / Dataset Original c23 c40 c23+noise
Binary classification 97.80% 95.95% 91.60% 91.95%
Anomaly detection 98.57 96.14 93.76 92.60
In addition to demonstrating the robustness, we also investigate in whether
the modeled co-motion patterns are generalizable, as recorded in Tab. 3. It
turns out that co-motion patterns constructed on relatively high-quality forgery
databases such as NeuralTextures [55] and Face2Face [56] can easily be gener-
alized for classifying other low-quality databases, while the opposite results in
inferior accuracy. This phenomenon is caused by that videos forged by Neural-
Textures are generally being more consistent, thus the inconsistency learned is
more narrowed down and specific, while the types of inconsistency vary greatly
in low-quality databases, which can be hard to model.
Table 3: Experiments for demonstrating generalizability of co-motion patterns.
Same experiment setting was employed as in Tab. 1.
Test on / Train on Deepfakes FaceSwap Face2Face NeuralTexture
Deepfakes N/A 92.15% 93.45% 95.85%
FaceSwap 84.25% N/A 76.75% 84.95%
Face2Face 70.30% 64.85% N/A 81.65%
NeuralTexture 76.20% 65.15% 77.85% N/A
4.3 Abnormality Reasoning
In this section, we explicitly interpret the implication of each co-motion pattern
for an intuitive understanding. A co-motion example of real videos can be found
in Fig. 6. As we illustrated, the local motion at 51 facial landmarks are estimated
as features, where the order of landmarks are preserved identically in all places
on purpose for better visual understanding. It is noteworthy that the order of
landmarks do not affect the performance as long as they are aligned during
experiments.
Consequently, each co-motion pattern describes the relationship of any pair
of two local motion features, where features from the same or highly correlated
facial component would instinctively have greater correlation. For instance, it is
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Fig. 6: An example of interpreting co-motion patterns.
apparent that two eyes would generally move in the same direction, as the center
area highlighted in Fig. 6. Similarly, a weak yet stable high correlation of the
first 31 features is consistently observed on all real co-motion patterns, which
conforms to the accordant movement of facial components on upper and mid-
dle face area. We also observe strong negative correlation, indicating opposite
movements, between upper lip and lower lip. This credits to the dataset contain-
ing a large volume of videos with people talking, while in forged videos such a
negative correlation is undermined, usually due to the fact that the videos are
synthesized in a frame-by-frame manner, thus the temporal relationship is not
well-preserved. Moreover, the co-motion is normalized in range [0, 1] for visual-
ization purpose which leads to the weakened difference between real and fake
co-motion patterns, while in original scale the difference can be more magnifi-
cent, verified by the experiments.
For an explicit comparison, we also average 1,000 ρ matrices from each source
to illustrate the distinction and which motion pattern in specific was not well-
learned as in Fig. 7. Evidently, co-motion patterns from forged videos fail to
model the negative correlation between upper lip and lower lip. Moreover, in
Deepfake and FaceSwap, the positive correlation between homogeneous compo-
nents (e.g. eyes and eyebrows) is also diluted, while in reality it would be difficult
to control them having uncorrelated motion. We also attempt to construct co-
motion patterns on another set of real videos [9] to illustrate the commonality of
co-motion patterns over all real videos. Additionally, we show that visually, the
structure of co-motion pattern could quickly converge as illustrated in Fig. 8,
which sustains our choices of building second-order pattern as it is less sensitive
to intra-instance variation.
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Real videos Deepfakes FaceSwap
Real videos from [9] Face2Face NeuralTexture
Fig. 7: Averaged co-motion pattern from different sources. Two real co-motion
patterns (leftmost column) collectively present component-wise motion consis-
tency while forged videos fail to maintain that property.
Fig. 8: Co-motion pattern comparison on the same video (original and deep-faked
based on the original one). As N increases, both co-motion patterns gradually
converge to the same structure.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
In this work, we propose a novel co-motion pattern, a second-order local motion
descriptor in order to detect whether the video is deep-faked. Our method is
fully interpretable and pretty robust to slight variations such as video compres-
sion and noises. We have achieved superior performance on the latest datasets
under classification and anomaly detection settings, and have comprehensively
evaluated various characteristics of our method including robustness and gener-
alizability. In the future, an interesting direction is to investigate whether a more
accurate motion estimation can be achieved as well as how temporal information
can be integrated within our method.
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